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Abstract
Empirical research documents persistent socioeconomic and race gaps in parental 
investments in children. This article presents a formal model that describes the 
process through which parents’ beliefs about the returns on investments in 
children evolve over time in light of new information that they receive regarding 
the outcomes of past investments. The model, which is based on Bayesian learning, 
accounts for how parents of low socioeconomic status may come to underinvest in 
their children because they have false low beliefs about the returns on investments. 
Moreover, the model describes how beliefs are transmitted across generations, 
thus creating dynasties of underinvesting parents who reproduce inequalities in 
children’s socioeconomic outcomes. Finally, this article uses National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth data to provide illustrative empirical evidence on key aspects of 
the proposed model. The main contribution of this article is to integrate parents’ 
beliefs about returns on investments into existing models of intergenerational 
transmissions.
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Introduction
Practitioners of empirical analyses based on Rational Choice Theory have 
long been aware that when individuals face various choices, they are rarely 
fully informed about what options they have and the returns on their choices, 
but rather base their decisions on personal beliefs and attitudes (Breen, 1999; 
Morgan, 2005; Piketty, 1995). The concept of beliefs has been subject to a 
large body of research in various contexts. For example, Calargo (2014), 
Lareau (2003), and Weininger and Lareau (2009) document how parents of 
high and low socioeconomic status (SES) differ in their beliefs about parent-
ing practices and desired school behaviors. Similarly, Morgan (2005) 
addresses how young people form beliefs about their educational opportuni-
ties and how these beliefs vary across racial groups. On a theoretical level, 
Breen (1999) presents a formal model which assumes that students hold 
beliefs about the relative returns on effort versus ability with respect to school 
outcomes and shows how students in theory can have stable, but false beliefs 
about these returns. Furthermore, recent research shows that parental resources 
and their investments in children have substantial impacts on educational, 
labor market, and health outcomes regardless of gender, race, and SES (Alwin 
and Thornton, 1984; Björklund and Salvanes, 2011; Cunha and Heckman, 
2007; Englund et al., 2004; Smyth et al., 2010; Yeung et al., 2002; Zhan and 
Sherraden, 2003). To date, however, no study has presented a comprehensive 
formal model analyzing how parents’ investments in their child are shaped by 
the beliefs they (the parents) have about the returns on those investments.
Parents’ monetary investments in buying toys and employing high-qual-
ity day care, as well as their time investments in reading and taking their 
child to museums, have been shown to generate large returns with respect to 
the child’s educational attainment, earnings, and behavioral problems 
(Björklund and Salvanes, 2011; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Deslandes et al., 
1997; Smyth et al., 2010; Todd and Wolpin, 2007). For example, Yeung et al. 
(2002) find that access to cognitively stimulating materials, such as newspa-
pers and books, improves a child’s cognitive skills and reduces behavioral 
problems. Jæger and Breen (2016) argue that parents actively use activities, 
such as museum visits, to transfer cultural knowledge to their children, 
thereby increasing academic performance and long-term success. Similarly, 
Englund et al. (2004) show significant returns on parental involvement in 
schools as well as the instructional skills of the parents, a finding which 
Deslandes et al. (1997) and Smyth et al. (2010) corroborate. Englund et al. 
(2004) also show that parents’ involvement and educational expectations for 
their children increase when the child performs well in school. Some research 
also points to mixed evidence of the uniformly positive returns to parental 
involvement in the home and suggests that certain parent behaviors can 
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adversely affect the child (Pomeranz et al., 2007). The overall picture, 
though, is that parental investments in children under most circumstances 
increase cognitive skills, improve educational attainment, and reduce behav-
ioral problems (Björklund and Salvanes, 2011; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; 
Englund et al., 2004; Smyth et al., 2010).
However, mounting empirical evidence also indicates that low SES and 
non-White parents tend to invest less in their children, not only in terms of 
monetary investments but also in terms of engaging their children in stimu-
lating activities (Mayer, 1997; Pomeranz et al., 2007; Todd and Wolpin, 
2007; Yeung et al., 2002). Consequently, differences in parental investments 
by SES and race, for example, may be key factors in explaining the persist-
ing inequalities in children’s outcomes. A wide range of theoretical models 
exist that account for SES and race gaps in parental investments in children. 
These models can, broadly speaking, be classified into socio-cultural repro-
duction models and rational choice models (Smyth et al., 2010).
Socio-cultural reproduction models attribute SES and/or race differences 
in parental investments and children’s achievements to differences in norms, 
values, and behavior and often emphasize the role of cultural resources or 
cultural capital (e.g. Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990; Fordham and Ogbu, 
1986; Kohn, 1977; Lareau, 2003). Intergenerational transmission of SES, in 
these models, happens when parents (in some cases, unwittingly) imbue 
their children with norms, values, and/or behaviors that the educational sys-
tem rewards. Rational choice models such as those presented by Becker and 
Tomes (1979, 1986), Cunha and Heckman (2007), Boudon (1974), Breen 
and Goldthorpe (1997), and Morgan (2005) instead conceptualize children 
and their parents as forward-looking rational agents who attempt to maxi-
mize their utility in light of their available information and preferences. In 
these models, intergenerational transmission of human capital happens 
through parents’ investments, which in turn depend on the child’s endow-
ments and the parents’ resources.
Although socio-cultural reproduction models differ from rational choice 
models in their behavioral assumptions as well as their implied mecha-
nisms, they also share several aspects. Pertinent to this article, both types of 
models have parents behaving in certain ways with respect to their children 
dependent on their SES. While this article presents a new rational choice 
model, it also acknowledges findings from research based on socio-cultural 
reproduction models, which document differences in beliefs and values 
concerning parental behavior across SES groups and races (Fordham and 
Ogbu, 1986; Lareau, 2003; Morgan, 2005).
Models such as the ones mentioned above have greatly expanded our 
understanding of why SES and race differences in parental investment and 
child outcomes exist and how they persist over time. However, each class of 
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models also has it shortcomings, which the model presented in this article 
attempts to amend. Socio-cultural reproduction models are rarely formalized, 
and their assumptions and mechanisms often remain implicit and difficult to 
test (for a notable exception, see Jæger and Breen (2016)). This article formal-
izes the role of SES and race for parental investments and makes explicit how 
these factors interact with parents’ beliefs about the returns on their invest-
ments in their children. Rational choice models typically operate on the 
assumption that parents are fully informed about the returns on their invest-
ments (e.g. Becker and Tomes, 1986; Cunha and Heckman, 2007). While 
such assumptions reduce the complexity of the model, they can be relaxed by 
explicitly incorporating parents’ beliefs about the returns on investments into 
the theoretical model. This provides a richer and more realistic account of the 
causes and consequences of parental investments as parents are unlikely to 
possess full information about the actual returns on their investments in their 
children. However, they do have beliefs about these returns that may or may 
not be consistent with the truth. It then follows that utility-maximizing parents 
invest in their children to the extent that they believe their investments will 
have a positive effect on child outcomes. Regardless of whether investments 
actually yield a return, parents who do not believe that investments matter, or 
who do not derive utility from their child’s outcomes, would not be expected 
to invest time and money in their children but rather to increase their personal 
consumption (Becker and Tomes, 1986).
Finally, Morgan (2005) indicates that there is little reason to believe that 
beliefs are static but rather that they change as individuals receive new infor-
mation, echoing the theoretical notion of beliefs presented in Breen (1999). In 
the case of returns on parental investments, if parents believe that their invest-
ments yield low returns with respect to their child’s school performance, they 
may invest little time and/or money in their child. However, if they experience 
that their child performs poorly in school, this may cause them to shift their 
beliefs toward higher returns on investments when they see that they did not 
invest much and their child performed poorly (Quadlin, 2014). This article 
models this process using Bayesian learning, which allows parents to gradu-
ally change their beliefs in light of new information while still taking into 
account prior beliefs (Anwar and Loughran, 2011; Breen, 1999; Breen and 
García-Peñalosa, 2002; Morgan, 2005; Piketty, 1995).
This article extends existing theoretical models of intergenerational trans-
missions in three respects. First, it proposes a formal model that uses 
Bayesian learning to explicitly incorporate parents’ beliefs about the returns 
on investments into the modeling framework. This model argues that parents 
are rational actors who, while having their children’s best interests at heart, 
may come to systematically underinvest in their children if they believe that 
the returns on their investments are lower than what they actually are. 
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Second, the article models how beliefs about returns on investments depend 
on SES and race, and it provides a theoretical explanation of the persistent 
SES and racial gaps in parental investments that previous research has docu-
mented. Third, the model incorporates an account of how beliefs about the 
returns on investments are transmitted across generations. If beliefs help to 
explain investment gaps, the intergenerational persistence of these gaps is 
conditional on children who, to some degree, inherit their parents’ beliefs. 
The literature that addresses the intergenerational transmission of beliefs 
normally assumes that children inherit their parents’ exact beliefs (Breen, 
1999; Piketty, 1995). While this assumption is both convenient and useful, 
the process through which beliefs are transmitted across generations may be 
modeled more completely by relaxing it.
Furthermore, this article uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth 1979–Children and Young Adults (NLSY79-CYA) to test key fea-
tures of the model. In particular, the empirical results illustrate that parents 
modify their investments over time based on prior investments and on their 
children’s academic performance. Many of the theoretical models presented 
in this article greatly owe their formulations and conceptualizations to Breen 
(1999), who presented similar models. While part of this article’s contribution 
comes from applying the framework of Breen (1999) to a new field—that of 
parental investments—the article also contributes beyond mere re-application 
of existing models. Apart from including an empirical test of some of the 
assumptions of the model, the article also offers a formalized mechanism for 
intergenerational transmission of beliefs and shows how systematic underin-
vestment due to low, stable beliefs may itself differ by SES and race.
The following section presents the formal model of how parents’ beliefs 
about the returns on investments evolve during their children’s childhoods 
and how beliefs partly determine parents’ level of investments. The subse-
quent section addresses intergenerational transmission of beliefs and dem-
onstrates that even when relaxing the assumption that children inherit their 
parents’ exact beliefs, they still tend toward doing so. The third section pre-
sents an empirical illustration of a set of the model’s predictions. The final 
section discusses the article’s findings and reflects on the limitations of the 
research as well as the prospects of future research.
A formal model of beliefs in returns on parental 
investments
This section proposes a formal model of the formation and evolution of 
beliefs regarding returns on parental investments. The section first out-
lines the processes leading to child academic performance and argues 
that this performance serves as a signal to parents about the returns on 
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their investments. Second, the section addresses parents’ decision-mak-
ing when determining how much to invest in their child by jointly consid-
ering the utility derived from both their child’s academic success and 
their personal consumption. Third, the section argues that the evolution 
of parents’ beliefs about the returns on their investments can be modeled 
using Bayesian learning models, and moreover, it shows how parents 
update beliefs in different ways depending on their prior beliefs. Fourth, 
the section shows that the model predicts the existence of two different 
sets of stable beliefs: one which leads to optimal parental investments in 
their child and one which, due to false beliefs, leads to underinvestment.
Child academic outcome as an imperfect signal
Following Burton et al. (2002), Cunha and Heckman (2007), and Jæger and 
Breen (2016), this article conceptualizes childhood as consisting of a series of 
time periods denoted as t T∈ … −{ , , , , }0 1 2 1 , with period T  marking the 
transition from childhood to adulthood. The initial time period, t0 , is the first 
period in which the child experiences an academic outcome, which typically 
occurs at enrollment in compulsory education.1 During each period, the child 
experiences academic outcomes such as grades, test scores, successful course 
completion, or some other outcome that (re)occurs during childhood. This 
article treats academic success as a binary state: the child either succeeds or 
fails in a given time period, which is denoted by A  (success) or ¬A  (failure), 
respectively. Moreover, the model assumes that all parents are equally capa-
ble of recognizing success and failure. While this assumption can be relaxed, 
this is not possible within the scope of this article. For each period, parents 
observe their child’s academic outcome (success or failure) and use this infor-
mation to update their beliefs about the likely returns on their investments. 
Finally, upon reaching adulthood in period T , the child forms her own beliefs 
about returns on parental investments based on her parents’ beliefs.
The probability that a child experiences academic success at time t  is 
denoted by P A t( )  and depends on parental investments at time t and other 
factors. These other factors, such as race, SES, child’s ability, school qual-
ity, teacher biases, and luck, are labeled X  and are considered to be outside 
the parents’ immediate control. Parental investments are denoted by It  and 
represent the amount of resources that parents invest to increase the proba-
bility of their child’s success, and moreover, these are resources the parents 
could have used for personal consumption. Resources include economic 
investments, for example, buying study materials and paying for tutoring, or 
time investments, such as helping the child with homework and arranging 
extracurricular activities. This article makes no distinction between the dif-
ferent types of investments. Both X  and It  range from 0 to 1, and X  is 
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assumed to be constant over time. The article assumes that each family has 
one child.
Thus, at any given time t , a child experiences academic success with 
probability P A t( ) , as determined by parental investments, It , and other fac-
tors, X . This section addresses the returns on It  and X  and explicitly 
details the conceptualization of beliefs with respect to returns. Following 
Breen (1999), consider two possible states of the world, ′s  and s. In state 
′s , parental investments are more important for academic success than other 
factors, X . The returns on parental investments and other factors are 
denoted by ′θ  and ′pi , respectively, with ′ > ′θ pi . Conversely, in state s , 
parental investments are less important than other factors and the respective 
returns are denoted by θ  and π, with θ pi< . All returns are constrained to 
be strictly greater than 0 and less than 1, which means that, regardless of the 
actual state of world, both parental investments and other factors positively 
affect academic success to some extent.2 The only difference between the 
two states is the relative importance of It  and X , and the two states are 
assumed to be symmetrical such that ′ − = − ′θ θ pi pi  (Breen, 1999). 
Accordingly, the two states reflect fundamentally different states of the 
world. It then follows that the probability that the child experiences aca-
demic success in state ′s  can be written as
P A s I X
t t
| ′ ′ ′( ) = +θ pi
And conversely, the probability that the child experiences success in 
state s  is
P A s I X
t t
|( ) = +θ pi
The world exists in one and only one of these states. That is, either paren-
tal investments are more important than other factors, or conversely, the 
opposite holds. Parents are unaware of the true state of the world but have 
subjective beliefs about the relative importance of their investments.3 These 
beliefs are denoted by θ  and π and can be expressed as a weighted average 
of θ  and ′θ  and π and ′pi , respectively. Parents do not necessarily believe 
completely in one of either opposing state but may have a stronger belief in 
one state than in the other. Belief in state ′s , denoted by zt , ranges from 0 
to 1 and may change over time. Parents’ belief in state s  is defined by 
( )1− zt . Thus, parents’ beliefs in the importance of parental investments 
and other factors, X , can be summed up by zt , such that
θ θ θt t tz z= + −( )′ 1
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and
pi pi pit t tz z= ′ + −( )1
As zt  approaches 1, parents’ belief in the returns on their investments 
increases relative to their belief that other factors affect educational success. 
At zt =1, parents fully believe that state ′s  is true, which means that they 
place more importance on parental investments than on other factors.4 In 
model terms, belief zt =1  leads to θ θt = ′  as parents’ belief in the returns 
on investments corresponds with the true returns, given that state ′s  is the 
true state of the world.5 The prototypical parent who holds this belief might 
be characterized as having a strong sense of control over their own life, a 
notion that they themselves play the greatest role in their child’s academic 
outcomes.6 The opposite belief, zt = 0, represents parents who fully believe 
state s  to be true, that is, that other factors, X , matter more than parental 
investments. These parents might be thought of as believing that their 
child’s academic outcome is, for the most part, not within their control but 
mostly determined by factors such as child’s innate ability, luck, and race.7
Combining the notation above, parents’ belief in the probability that their 
child succeeds in school is written as


P A X I
t t t t( ) = +pi θ
Thus, while parents’ beliefs in the probability of their child succeeding 
academically, P A t( ) , as well as the actual probability, P A t( ) , depend on 
parental investments and other factors, X , neither are completely deter-
mined by these factors. Given that both πt and θt  lie between 0 and 1, 
P A t( )  and P A t( )  will always be less than 1 regardless of the state of the 
world and the exact values of the parameters. Parents, however, do not 
observe the actual probability of academic success but only the binary 
realization of P A t( ) , that is, the child either succeeds or fails. Accordingly, 
for two reasons, child academic success or failure is an imperfect signal of 
the returns on parental investments. First, it is not possible for parents to 
disentangle the returns on X  and It  in a single time period, even if they 
observe both, because they do not know their precise returns. In other 
words, parents cannot know with absolute certainty whether the reason 
their child succeeded or failed was due to their own investments or to 
other factors such as having high or low SES. Second, the child’s aca-
demic outcome is partly stochastic. This means that even if parents invest 
heavily in a child and the child has a value of P A t( )  close to 1, the child 
will eventually experience academic failure as P A t( )  is always less than 
1. In this situation, parents most likely respond by updating their beliefs 
about the returns on their investments.
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In summary, the model proposes that the probability that a child is aca-
demically successful depends on both parental investments, It , and other 
factors outside the parents’ immediate control, X . Parents use information 
about their child’s academic outcomes as signals regarding the returns on 
their investments. However, this signal is imperfect because the probability 
that a child succeeds is the product of both parental investments and other 
factors. Furthermore, child academic success is partly stochastic, as by con-
struction the probability that the child is successful will always be less than 
1. Parents, not knowing the actual importance of investments and other fac-
tors, have beliefs about their respective returns that they rely on when decid-
ing their level of investment.
Parental utility and level of investment
Models of intergenerational transmission and human capital accumulation 
often argue that parents face a trade-off between investments in children and 
personal consumption (i.e. Ayalew, 2005; Becker and Tomes, 1986; 
Behrmann, 1997). It is demonstrated herein how parents, all of whom pos-
sess a limited stock of resources, make decisions about this trade-off based 
on their beliefs about the probability that their child will succeed academi-
cally. If all parents were perfectly informed about this probability, differ-
ences in investments would be the sole product of differences in resources 
and altruism, as in Becker and Tomes (1986). However, the utility function 
presented herein incorporates the role of parental beliefs not previously 
included in economic models of intergenerational transmissions. Moreover, 
the model illustrates how parents determine the level of investment that will 
maximize their utility.
The utility function includes two components: child academic success 
and personal consumption. These are interdependent as resources can be 
used either for parental investment, thereby increasing the probability that 
the child is academically successful, or for personal consumption, but not 
for both. The model assumes that while all parents have a preference for 
their child’s academic success, they also have some preference for personal 
consumption. Parents weigh these two preferences against each other by 
maximizing their joint utility, Ut
p
U a P A U P A U a R It
p
t A t A t
= ( ) − − ( )( )( ) + −( ) −( )¬ln  1 1 ln  (1)
where a  is an altruism parameter that captures parents’ preference for their 
child’s academic success relative to their own consumption. UA  and U¬A 
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are the utilities of their child succeeding or failing, respectively, and are 
subject to U UA A> ¬ , which means that the child’s academic success yields 
more utility and their academic failure yields disutility.8 Note that while U¬A 
is a positive quantity, it is understood as a disutility. That is, the larger U¬A 
is, the more disutility parents get from experiencing child academic failure. 
R  denotes the parents’ total stock of resources, standardized between 0 and 
1 with R It> , as parents cannot invest more resources than they possess. 
The budget constraint, R It− , implicitly states that parents who possess 
more resources will, all other things being equal, invest more in their child 
than parents who possess fewer resources as their own consumption more 
easily reaches a level where the marginal returns on personal consumption 
become negligible compared to increasing the probability that the child is 
academically successful (Becker and Tomes, 1986).
The utility function also assumes that both expected utilities, UA  and 
U¬A, remain constant over time as parents are assumed not to receive new 
information concerning the value of education until they can observe their 
adult child at time T .9 Moreover, utilities are constant for all parents, which 
implies that although beliefs in the returns on investments may differ across 
parents, their expected returns on the child’s academic success do not dif-
fer.10 The utility that parents derive from their child’s academic success is 
based on their belief in the probability that their child succeeds, P A t( ) , 
which is determined partly by It , thus forcing parents to decide between 
investing in their child and increasing their personal consumption. Log-
transforming both sources of utility reflects diminishing returns on both 
child academic success and personal consumption.
The utility function above describes how parents derive utility from both 
child academic success and their personal consumption, and that they do not 
know exactly how much their child benefits from their investments. This 
lack of full information constrains parents to invest according to their beliefs 
about the returns on their investments, θt , and on other factors, πt. In model 
terms, parents maximize equation (1) by choosing their optimum level of 
investments, It, defined by
I
U aX a X Ra U Ra aX X
U U
t
A t t t A t t
t A A
=
+ − − −( ) + + −( )( )
+ −
¬
¬
1     

pi pi θ θ pi
θ 2U aA¬( )
 (2)
Appendix 1 shows the derivation of equation (2). It  increases uniformly 
in R  and decreases in both X  and  π~t (for proofs, see Appendix 2). The 
model thus predicts that the higher the level of parents’ resources, the more 
they will invest in their children, and conversely, the larger they believe the 
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returns to other factors are relative to investments, the less they will invest. 
Furthermore, the higher the level of their other factors, X , the less they will 
invest as these other factors substitute investments in the production of aca-
demic success. Regarding altruism, a, the utility of academic success, UA, 
and the disutility of academic failure, U¬A, these do not have a uniformly 
positive or negative impact on parental investments. Rather, the direction of 
their influence depends on the model’s other parameters. For example, if a 
set of parents are highly altruistic, and furthermore believe that other factors 
have large returns relative to investments, then it stands to reason that 
increasing their investments might not be their optimal choice. Appendix 2 
explicates the conditions under which parental investments increase and 
decrease in these parameters. Finally, parents’ investments increase in their 
belief about the returns to these investments. Note that this condition 
requires assuming that ( ( ) / ( )/ )U U X XA A t t¬ < − pi pi1 , which is only vio-
lated when both πt and X  are small and the difference between U¬A and UA 
is also small. Appendix 2 details the derivation of this condition.
Bayesian learning in the evolution of beliefs
This article has argued that beliefs play a crucial part in shaping parental 
investments. Moreover, beliefs may change over time. It is now proposed 
that parents are Bayesian learners who update their beliefs in light of new 
information. Bayesian learning allows parents to change their beliefs based 
on the signaling value of their child’s academic success or failure while 
acknowledging that new beliefs do not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, parents 
have a prior belief before receiving a signal from their child. They then 
update their prior belief in accordance with the new information provided 
by the signal as they form their posterior belief. This subsequent belief then 
becomes their new prior as parents receive even more signals over time. In 
this way, both prior beliefs and new signals contribute to the evolution of 
parents’ beliefs about returns on investments in their child.
At time 0, parents have a belief, z0, about the relative importance of their 
investments versus the importance of other factors. They inherit this belief 
from their parents, as described in detail in this section. z0  serves as the 
starting point of the evolution of their beliefs and is referred to as the initial 
belief. As previously illustrated, parents then optimize their joint utility by 
choosing their optimal level of investments, It . At time t , they receive a 
signal from their child, that is, whether he or she succeeded or failed aca-
demically. This signal provides them with new information about the returns 
on their investments and allows them to update their beliefs in time period 
t +1. This model proposes that parents update beliefs following Bayes’ 
theorem, such that
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z
z P A s z
z P A s z z P A s z
t
t t
t t t t
( )
| ,
, ,
+ =
( )
( ) + −( ) ( )
′
′1 1
This is a standard application of Bayesian learning (Breen, 1999; Breen 
and García-Peñalosa, 2002; Piketty, 1995). Note that this method of updat-
ing requires that parents consider the signal, whether it comes in the shape 
of grades, test scores, or comments from teachers, to be valid information, 
to which they should react. For simplicity, this article assumes that parents 
accept the signal at face value, although a more realistic elaboration of the 
model could incorporate different levels of parents’ trust in the signal. 
Ultimately, though, as long as parents trust the information somewhat (and 
do not act counter to it), the model’s properties and predictions hold.
A vital property of this learning model is that because parents are condi-
tioned on their prior beliefs, different parents may react in different ways to 
the same new information. For example, a child’s academic success can 
cause parents to either increase or decrease their belief in state ′s , depending 
on their previous beliefs. The intuition behind this process is as follows. For 
the remainder of this article, suppose, without loss of generality, that state ′s  
is the true state of the world. This means that parental investments are more 
important in producing academic success than are other factors, X . This 
belief, responding to zt =1 , is henceforth referred to as the true belief.11 
Parents holding this belief know the true returns on their investments and 
invest accordingly. Furthermore, suppose that two types of parents exist, 
Paraz*  and Parbz* , who are characterized by having initial beliefs, z0 , above 
and below, respectively, a certain threshold belief, z*. Paraz*  parents have a 
strong belief in the returns on investments and invest heavily in their child. 
Their child then experiences either academic success or failure and they, in 
turn, update their beliefs. In the case of academic success, the parents’ belief 
that their investments yield large returns is re-affirmed, and thus, they invest 
even more in the next period until they attain the level corresponding to the 
true belief. Conversely, if their child experiences academic failure, parents 
will reason that investing has lower returns than they expected and they will 
decrease their belief in their returns. The other parental group, Parbz*  par-
ents, exhibit low investments due to their low belief in their returns. If their 
child experiences academic success, their low beliefs in parental investments 
will be re-affirmed, and they will further decrease their belief that state ′s  is 
true. On the contrary, should their child experience academic failure, they 
will increase their belief in the importance of investments. Figure 1 illus-
trates this process.
Figure 1 shows parental belief, zt  on the x-axis and updated belief zt+1  
on the y-axis. The figure illustrates how beliefs change depending on both 
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initial belief and information received from child outcomes. The solid and 
dashed lines indicate how beliefs change if the child experiences academic 
success or failure, respectively, and both adhere to the pattern as described. 
In other words, depending on whether the prior belief zt  lies above or 
below a certain threshold, z*, academic success or failure may either 
increase or decrease parental belief in returns on investments. In this way, 
Paraz*  and Parbz*  parents may be identical in all other parameters but may 
still, conditioned only on prior beliefs, draw different conclusions from the 
same piece of information. The thin solid line represents no change in 
beliefs, which is a possible outcome only when zt  equals 0, 1, or z
*, cases 
that are treated separately in the next section.
Steady state beliefs
As presented in the previous section, this model does not treat beliefs as 
static. Parents continuously receive signals from their child and use these 
signals to make inferences about the returns on their investments in their 
child. Accordingly, the proposed model leads to two steady-state beliefs (or 
equilibria) in which new signals about academic success or failure do not 
change parents’ beliefs. These beliefs lead to underinvestment in the child, 
which then causes investment gaps that are conditioned on prior beliefs and 
on other factors, such as SES and race.
In a system of Bayesian learning, steady-state beliefs are possible at two 
different values (Piketty, 1995; Smith and Sørensen, 2000). One such value 
is at the true belief, zt =1, and the other is at some intermediate belief, z
*. 
Figure 1. The evolution of belief.
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The latter belief is false as it does not place full weight on the true state of 
the world; however, it is still stable. In the true belief state, parents place full 
weight on state ′s , and thus, they know the actual returns on their invest-
ments. According to the terminology used in the model, having this stable, 
true belief means that pi pi= ′  and θ θ= ′, that is, parents’ beliefs about 
returns are in accordance with the actual returns. This belief is stable since 
all new information will tend toward confirming the existing belief (Breen, 
1999). It is also the most desirable belief for all parents to hold as knowing 
the true state of the world allows them to invest optimally and increase the 
probability that their child will be successful.
Figure 1 also shows that there exists a certain value of zt  that is less than 
1 and where beliefs do not change regardless of success or failure. This 
belief, denoted by z*, occurs when the solid and the dashed lines cross and 
represent a stable, but false belief. Put differently, the crossing of these lines 
means that, at this belief, parents are unable to gain any new information 
from their child’s academic success or failure as both signals provide equal 
support for states s  and ′s  being true. Thus, P A s P A s( | ) ( | )= ′ , and this 
belief is stable as all new information confirms the existing belief. This is a 
central feature of the model. In this way, z*  represents a steady-state mis-
conception, which is a stable, low false belief regarding the returns on 
parental investments that parents cannot escape through Bayesian learning. 
Persistent investment gaps between disadvantaged and advantaged groups, 
with respect to SES, race, and so on, that have been identified in previous 
research can be conceptualized as systematic differences in the steady-state 
beliefs that these groups come to hold. If disadvantaged groups tend toward 
false beliefs with greater probability than their advantaged counterparts, 
they will then consistently underinvest in their children, thereby reproduc-
ing their low social status.
However, before making the above claim, the mechanism of the model 
that generates z*  must be clarified. From this point forward, consistent with 
previous research, this stable, false belief is labeled the confounded learning 
equilibrium (CLE) (Breen, 1999; Breen and García-Peñalosa, 2002). Unlike 
the true belief, which occurs at zt =1  for all parents, the CLE takes on a 
specific value for each set of parents depending on several individual spe-
cific factors. In a given family, parents’ CLE occurs at their value of It , 
dubbed as I *, which satisfies
θ pi θ piI X I X* *+ = +′ ′  (3)
that is, the level of parental investment that makes child academic success 
equally likely, regardless of whether the world is in state s  or ′s . Isolating 
I *  in equation (3), plugging it into equation (2), and solving for z  lead to
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where ∆ = − = −′ ′θ θ pi pi , as per previous assumptions. Equation (4) shows 
that the value of the CLE varies across parents conditioned on their value of 
X , such as SES or race, as well as on their resources and altruism.12 This is 
a key feature of the CLE. Compare, for example, a high SES and a low SES 
family. If both of these families have adopted the CLE and thus hold low, 
false beliefs regarding their returns on their investments, low SES parents 
will still invest even less than the high SES parents, as the latter have a 
higher valued CLE.13 In this way, z*  is not an objective value, unlike in the 
true belief, but it is rather dependent on parents’ value of X . Thus, different 
values of z*  represent degrees of misconception. While having a CLE close 
to the true belief will result in an underinvestment, the underinvestment is 
less than when the CLE is close to 0.
Before considering the role of other factors, X , with respect to the CLE, 
the process leading to parents moving toward either the CLE or the true 
belief must be explored. This process is contingent upon both the value of 
z*  for the parents in question and on their initial belief of z0  being above 
or below z*.
The arrows parallel to the x-axis in Figure 2 indicate the possible patterns 
of convergence. Converging with z*  is contingent on initial beliefs as fol-
lows: Parbz*  parents, holding initial beliefs below their CLE, will always 
shift upward toward z*  over time, which implies that it is impossible for 
them to reach the true belief. The certainty of upward movement comes 
from the fact that holding a truly false belief, that is, zt = 0, is not a steady 
state (Breen, 1999; Piketty, 1995), and thus, the CLE is their only steady-
state option. In other words, as long as parents receive signals from their 
child, their beliefs will evolve in one direction or the other until they reach 
a stable belief, the CLE. At this point, parents will cease to update their 
beliefs although they are underinvesting, as z* <1. On the contrary, Paraz*  
parents, defined as holding initial beliefs above the CLE, may shift either 
upward toward the true belief or downward toward their CLE, as indicated 
by the double arrow in Figure 2. They risk converging downward to z*  with 
probability p
p
z z
z z
=
−
−( )
0
0 1
*
*
 (5)
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Thus, it follows that movement upward to zt =1  has a probability of 
1− p  (Breen, 1999). The intuition is as follows. The further z*  is away 
from the initial belief, the lower the probability of moving toward the CLE. 
Thus, while belonging to the Paraz*  group does not ensure convergence to 
the true belief, it remains a possibility. Parbz*  parents, on the contrary, have 
no chance of converging with the true belief, but they will eventually reach 
the CLE. Accordingly, the model demonstrates that gaps in parental invest-
ments may be due to sets of parents holding different stable beliefs. Parents 
in the true belief state will always invest more than CLE parents, thus result-
ing in an investment gap as illustrated in Figure 3.
In addition to the investment gap illustrated in Figure 3, another gap is 
possible if the CLE varies systematically between advantaged and disad-
vantaged social groups. From equation (4), it is possible that z*  is depend-
ent on other factors, X , such that
∂
∂
>
z
X
*
0
See Appendix 3 for full proof and the conditions under which this holds 
true. Thus, the CLE assumes a higher value for parents with favorable other 
factors, X , for example, high SES parents, which suggests that advantaged 
groups will invest more heavily in their children than will disadvantaged 
groups, even if both hold low false beliefs. Figure 4 illustrates this point.
Figure 4 presents two sets of success and failure trajectories, one each for 
advantaged and disadvantaged parents (the failure trajectories are dimmed 
Figure 2. The evolution of beliefs and pattern of convergence.
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for ease of understanding). As with previous figures, the CLE occurs where 
the success and failure trajectories simultaneously cross the diagonal, thus 
indicating no change in belief. The figure further indicates that investment 
gaps between advantaged and disadvantaged groups are present even when 
both groups are at their CLE.
A final aspect of the relationship between other factors and the CLE to 
consider is that, for Paraz*  parents, the higher the CLE, the higher the risk of 
moving toward the CLE rather than moving toward the true belief. In other 
words, the closer the CLE is to the initial belief, the stronger its pull. Consider 
two sets of Paraz*  parents, identical in all factors except for SES, that is, one 
Figure 3. The evolution of beliefs and the investment gap.
Figure 4. The evolution of beliefs and investment gap with false belief.
Hjorth-Trolle 125
set is high SES parents and the other is low SES parents. They hold the same 
initial belief, z0 , but due to a higher value of X , the high SES parents’ CLE 
also has a higher value. This higher value not only makes the CLE less severe 
in terms of underinvestment but also makes the parents more likely to con-
verge toward the CLE (cf. equation (5)). Thus, compared to low SES parents, 
high SES parents are at a higher risk of holding a false belief, albeit the con-
sequences are less severe. Intuitively, imagine two low SES parents who 
believe strongly that their investments will yield a high return. When their 
child experiences academic success, these parents may be less likely than 
high SES parents to attribute this success to other factors, such as their own 
low SES, knowing that they are at a comparative disadvantage. Thus, having 
a high CLE is not always an advantage, as it also increases the risk of down-
ward convergence rather than adopting the true belief.
Finally, a remark upon the CLE, which discusses its status as an equilib-
rium. Unlike previous research employing this concept (Breen, 1999; Breen 
and García-Peñalosa, 2002; Piketty, 1995), this article recognizes that the 
CLE is not “trembling hand perfect” (Carbonell-Nicolau, 2011; Selten, 
1975). That is, the CLE is only an equilibrium as long as parents update 
their beliefs and choose their level of investments without any error or con-
fusion. Should a pair of parents at the CLE invest above their expected level 
for stochastic reasons, they might escape the CLE and converge to the true 
belief.14 However, as proposed by Breen (1999), though never formalized, 
updating beliefs might also impose a cost on the parents, making them less 
likely to update their beliefs. As such, the equilibrium property of the CLE 
might be compromised in opposing directions: If parents are prone to sto-
chastic variation in their level of investments, the CLE is not necessarily 
stable. On the contrary, if there is a high enough cost to updating beliefs, 
every belief between 0 and 1 is a potential equilibrium (though not a CLE) 
as parents weigh the cost of updating against the benefits of having an 
updated belief. Concurrently, as long as both (or none) of these forces are in 
play, the CLE has the possibility to exist as a stable equilibrium to the degree 
that they cancel each other out. In the interest of space, this article does not 
formalize the circumstances under which this balance occurs, but implicitly 
assumes that it does. Future research, both theoretical and empirical, should 
address these potential limitations of the CLE.
In conclusion, this article has now proposed a formal model that concep-
tualizes parental investment gaps as arising from systematic differences in 
stable beliefs about the returns on investments and has identified two types 
of possible gaps. First, a possible gap exists between parents holding the 
true belief and parents at their CLE, as illustrated in Figure 3. Second, a 
possible gap exists between advantaged and disadvantaged parents both at 
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their CLE. This gap between false beliefs is a product of disadvantaged 
parents’ CLE being systematically lower than that of advantaged parents, as 
presented in Figure 4.
Intergenerational transmission of beliefs
It has been argued herein that parents continuously receive imperfect sig-
nals from their child and use these signals to make inferences about the 
returns on their investments and that over time parents shift toward one of 
two stable beliefs: the CLE or the true belief. Which belief parents adopt is 
determined by an interplay between parents’ initial beliefs and other factors, 
such as SES and race. The model argues that unfavorable factors outside of 
the parent’s immediate control, for example, low SES, increase the detri-
mental effect of having low initial beliefs in the returns on parental invest-
ments by lowering the parents’ CLE, which in turn results in underinvestment. 
This section expands the model to consider how beliefs are transmitted from 
one generation to the next and, moreover, to examine the long-run conse-
quences of parents’ beliefs in the reproduction of SES. In doing so, the 
model explains how parents form their initial beliefs.
There is strong evidence that children inherit values and beliefs from 
their parents (Bisin et al., 2011; Dahl et al., 2014; Hitlin, 2006; Kohn, 1977; 
Weininger and Lareau, 2009). Research that has used Bayesian learning 
models argues that children inherit beliefs from their parents in a direct way, 
which suggests that their initial beliefs are identical to the steady-state 
beliefs of their parents (Breen, 1999; Piketty, 1995). Introducing a genera-
tion subscript g c p∈{ , }  for child and parents, respectively, this type of 
transmission mechanism (Breen, 1999; Piketty, 1995) is formalized as
z zc Tp0 =  (6)
and
z zTp p∈{ }* ;1
This simple model of belief transmission means that a child’s initial 
beliefs can only be either the true belief or his or her parents’ CLE, assum-
ing that parents have had sufficient time to adopt a steady state at time T . 
The main limitation in assuming perfect transmission of beliefs is that, over 
sufficient generations, all parents’ beliefs would eventually converge with 
the truth. This can be inferred as all children who inherit their parents’ true 
beliefs will remain at this steady state, and all children who inherit their 
parents’ CLE have the possibility to move upward if z z zc p c0 = >
* *
.
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However, relaxing the assumption of perfect transmission of beliefs 
breaks this deterministic pattern by introducing a stochastic error term, 
ε < −1 zp
* , in the transmission process. The nature of the error term is such 
that while information is not perfectly transmitted, the noise is never great 
enough for the child to hold initial beliefs in another steady state than that 
of his or her parents. Introducing ε  in equation (6) leads to the following 
two models of transmission, which are conditioned on the parents’ steady 
state
z zc Tp0 1 1= − =ε |
and
z z z zc p Tp p0 = ± =
* *|ε
Considering equation (5), the probability that a child converges with the 
CLE if his or her parents held the true belief at time T  is
p z
z
z
c Tp
c
c
=( ) = − −
−( ) −( )
1
1
1 1
ε
ε
*
*
Conversely, a child whose parents had adopted the CLE will, when he or 
she enters adulthood, also adopt the CLE with probability
p z z
z z
z z
c Tp c
p c
p c
=( ) = ± −
±( ) −( )
*
* *
* *
ε
ε 1
as long as z zp c
* *± <ε . If the child’s initial belief is lower than zc
* , conver-
gence with the CLE is assured, as evidenced in Figure 2. In this model, the 
intergenerational transmission of beliefs is non-deterministic. The probabil-
ity that the child adopts either the CLE or the true belief is by no means 
independent of the parental steady state as parental beliefs affect this pro-
cess in a probabilistic manner. In other words, steady states are steady 
within a generation but not necessarily across generations. Nonetheless, 
when considering several generations, subsequent beliefs about the returns 
on parental investments is not a random walk from one generation to the 
next, and the probability that a child adopts his or her parents’ steady state 
remains higher than the probability that he or she does not.
The model suggests that intergenerational transmission of beliefs has 
clear implications for the persistence of parental investment gaps as 
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underinvesting parents at the CLE are likely to pass on this false belief to 
their child. Accordingly, the intra- and intergenerational dynamics in the evo-
lution of beliefs reveal that the level of investments is established in one 
generation and then passed on to the next. Thus, the model leads to two types 
of dynasties: one in which parents underinvest due to false beliefs and one in 
which parents invest in accordance with the true state of the world. In addi-
tion, as previously shown, the CLE of disadvantaged groups occurs at a 
lower value than it does for advantaged groups, thus placing low SES fami-
lies at a double disadvantage. First, they tend to transmit their false beliefs in 
the low returns on investments to their children. Second, this false belief has 
a more detrimental effect on their investments even when compared to the 
false beliefs of high SES families, as the latter have a higher value of CLE. 
In this manner, the model helps to understand how investment gaps persist 
across generations, which then leads to gaps in education, income, and health 
(Ayalew, 2005; Burton et al., 2002; Card, 1999; Reynolds and Ross, 1998).
Empirical illustration
An empirical illustration of key aspects of the proposed formal model is 
necessary. As previously stated by Breen (1999), it is challenging to test 
Bayesian learning models such as these, as doing so in this case requires 
longitudinal and reliable measures of beliefs, parental investments, and 
child academic success or failure. Absent such a data source, this article 
uses an empirical measure of parents’ investments as a proxy for parents’ 
beliefs about the returns on investments. While not ideal, such a framework 
may provide provisional evidence on the usefulness of the model. Following 
Breen (1999), the model’s predictions are analyzed by evaluating “testable 
propositions about how [parents’ beliefs] should change conditional on its 
previous value and on the outcome of the event in question” (p. 475). 
Specifically, the hypothesis that parents with either an initial low or high 
level of investment are likely to adopt a stable belief, the CLE or the true 
belief, respectively, is tested. Thus, these groups should not make adjust-
ments to their investments in light of new information about child academic 
success. On the contrary, parents with an initial level of investment in the 
middle of the distribution of investments should change their level of invest-
ment when observing child academic success or failure (cf. Figure 5).
Data and variables
The empirical illustration uses data from NLSY-CYA. These data are the 
best-suited available data for this purpose as they are longitudinal, measured 
every second year, and have detailed information on parental investment, 
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child academic achievement, and a multitude of parent and child background 
factors. The data include observations only if they have valid information for 
all variables for two consecutive periods between 1988 and 2010, which is 
the span of the data that include parental investment measures. This sam-
pling frame leads to an analysis sample of 5434 children aged 6–14 years 
with 75% of children aged 6–10 years.
The model uses changes in parental investments over time as the depend-
ent variable. While ideally the analysis would instead focus on changes in 
parents’ beliefs, to my knowledge, no such longitudinal data exist. Using 
actual investments as a proxy is not perfect, but the assumption that actual 
investments are linked to beliefs about their importance is supported by the 
theoretical model and also tentatively by the data. When the mothers in the 
data are first surveyed about their child, they report whether they believe 
children learn best on their own or whether their parents should teach 
them.15 Mothers who believe that parents should teach their children also 
tend to exhibit higher levels of investments, lending some credence to this 
assumption.
This article measures parental investments using a series of variables 
from the HOME-SF battery of questions pertaining to both money spent on 
and time spent with the child, providing a single variable that captures over-
all parental investments (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2015). The battery includes the number of books the child has, 
whether the child has a musical instrument, whether he or she is enrolled in 
extra lessons or extracurricular activities, how often the child is taken to a 
museum or a performance, how often parents assist with homework, and 
how often parents discuss television programs with the child.16 Appendix 4 
describes the wording and distributions of all items.
Figure 5. Illustration of the empirical hypothesis.
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The main explanatory variable in the analysis is the child’s academic 
success or failure as measured by changes in the Peabody Individual 
Achievement Test (PIAT) of mathematics and reading. This test is consid-
ered a highly reliable and valid assessment of academic ability, its results 
correlate strongly with other cognitive measures (US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2015), and it is often used as a measure of academic ability (Fryer 
and Levitt, 2004; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994; Todd and Wolpin, 2007; 
Waldfogel et al., 2002). However, it is important to note that this test score 
is not viewed directly by the parents and only serves as a signal insofar as it 
correlates with other measures that parents observe, such as grades, SAT 
scores, or passing classes. Thus, the variable is inherently a weak signal and 
is likely to underestimate the changes in investments that would occur from 
stronger signals. In light of this circumstance, the analysis code for test 
scores is divided into three groups: success, failure, or no signal. Parents 
whose child’s changes in test scores fall in the upper or lower quartile of the 
distribution of test score changes receive a signal of child academic success 
or failure, respectively.17 The empirical model assumes that test score 
changes in the middle part of the distribution are too weak a signal for par-
ents to respond in a meaningful way. All models also control for race and 
sex of the child, mother’s education, and changes over time in household 
disposable income. The models do not control for child age as the sample 
has little variation in child age, and performing the analysis separately for 
age groups does not alter the results substantially (results not shown). Table 
1 summarizes these variables.
Furthermore, Table 2 shows how parents’ initial level of investment var-
ies by their observable characteristics. Higher income and higher maternal 
education are both associated with substantially increased parental invest-
ment. White parents invest more on average than both Hispanic and Black 
parents do, and girls tend to benefit from a slightly higher level of invest-
ments than boys do. These differences follow the expected patterns consid-
ering both the formal model and previous findings and suggests that they 
should be included as control variables in the analysis.
Model illustration: heterogeneous responses to signals from 
the child
To test the hypothesis presented herein, this section proposes a model that 
exploits variations over time in parental investments and child test scores. 
The model regresses the change in parental investments on changes in the 
child’s reading and math test scores, representing success, failure, or no 
signal, as described above, net of a vector of controls. By estimating a 
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total of three regression models for parents with a low, intermediate, or 
high level of prior investments, the model evaluates whether these three 
groups react differently to their child’s signals of academic success or 
failure. As changes in both test scores and parental investments occur 
simultaneously over a period of 2 years, causality does not only flow from 
changes in test scores to changes in investments but also from changes in 
investments to changes in test scores. Accordingly, over the course of the 
2 years, multiple updates may occur. The model is descriptive and seeks to 
describe heterogeneity in responses conditioned on initial levels of invest-
ments rather than to evaluate the causal link between test scores and 
parental investments. The model uses ordinary least squares for estima-
tion and takes the following form
∆ ∆inv e| inv test X0 0 1 2= + + +β β β
where the dependent variable, ∆inv , represents changes in parental invest-
ments from period 0 to 1 when measured continuously and standardized for 
ease of interpretation. Similar to changes in test scores, ∆test , initial invest-
ments, inv0, is a vector of three categories, specifically, the lowest quartile 
(the reference category), the highest quartile, and the intermediate quartiles; 
X  is a vector of the control variables described above, β0  is a constant 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Constant variables
Child race  
 White 0.489 (0.500)
 Hispanic 0.205 (0.404)
 African American 0.306 (0.461)
Child gender = female 0.504 (0.500)
Mother’s years of education 12.658 (2.484)
N 5434
 Time-variant variables
 t0 t1
Parental investment −0.002 (0.759) 0.019 (0.768)
Net household income 47,426 (76,407) 50,651 (70,667)
PIAT Math test score 30.788 (14.041) 43.574 (12.131)
PIAT Reading test score 30.676 (13.050) 42.030 (12.179)
N 5434 5434
PIAT: Peabody Individual Achievement Test.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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term and all other βs  are regression coefficients where bold font denotes a 
vector, and e  is a random error term that is estimated robustly within family 
clusters to avoid autocorrelation between siblings. The central term of the 
model is vector β1, which reflects the associations between changes in test 
scores and parental investments. The main hypothesis is that this vector is 
either larger or smaller than 0 for the middle group between the steady 
states. For the highest and lowest quartiles of initial investments, the expec-
tation is that the vector is 0 as these two groups are more likely to hold a 
stable belief, whether it is the CLE or the true belief. Table 3 presents the 
empirical results for vector β1  conditioned on inv0  and using test scores 
from reading and mathematics, respectively:
Overall, the empirical results follow expectations as parents in the top 
and the bottom quartiles of the initial investment distribution do not adjust 
their investments due to changes in child test scores. By contrast, parents 
whose initial investments are in the two intermediate quartiles increase 
their investments significantly in light of positive changes in test scores, 
and vice versa. These results support the hypothesis that investments only 
change for parents who have not yet adopted one of the two stable beliefs. 
Compared to using math test scores, effect sizes are larger and p-values are 
smaller when using reading test scores, perhaps because the ability to read 
and write is a larger component of the everyday interactions that parents 
Table 2. Initial level of parental investment by parent characteristics.
HOME score 
(standardized)
No. of observations
Child race
 White 0.156 (0.654) 2659
 Hispanic −0.184 (0.761) 1112
 African American −0.134 (0.857) 1663
Child gender
 Male −0.021 (0.760) 2696
 Female 0.016 (0.759) 2738
Household income
 1st quartile −0.285 (0.798) 1361
 2nd quartile −0.107 (0.743) 1355
 3rd quartile 0.079 (0.719) 1361
 4th quartile 0.303 (0.641) 1357
Mother’s years of education
 <12 −0.320 (0.818) 1213
 12–15 −0.008 (0.704) 3326
 ≥16 0.450 (0.641) 895
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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have with their child. In conclusion, the empirical results are consistent 
with a central assumption in the proposed formal model. That is, parents 
respond differently to the same signals of child academic performance 
when they have different prior levels of investments. This finding cau-
tiously points to the feasibility of conceptualizing parents as Bayesian 
learners and supports the notion that multiple stable beliefs exist. At the 
very least, any conceptualization of parents learning the returns on their 
investments should include the possibility of holding a stable, but false 
belief. Despite the returns on parental investments presented in previous 
literature works (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Todd and Wolpin, 2007; 
Yeung et al., 2002), these parents maintain a low level of investments 
regardless of their child’s academic failure or success. Thus, these parents 
represent the prototype of parents who believe that they do not have a sub-
stantial influence on their child’s academic success when compared to 
other factors, such as race, luck, teacher bias, school quality, or child abil-
ity. Conversely, parents with high levels of investment do not respond to 
the signals they receive from their child because they are already convinced 
(rightly) that they know the actual returns on their investments.
Table 3. Effects of test scores on changes in investments—conditional on initial 
investments.
Low initial inv. Moderate initial inv. High initial inv.
Changes in PIAT reading test scores
  Lowest quartile 
(ref. cat.)
– – –
 2nd quartile −0.005 (0.066) 0.085† (0.051) 0.027 (0.071)
 3rd quartile 0.041 (0.072) 0.141** (0.049) −0.008 (0.071)
  Highest quartile −0.015 (0.077) 0.151** (0.049) 0.118 (0.073)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 1360 2717 1357
Changes in PIAT math test scores
  Lowest quartile 
(ref. cat.)
– –  
 2nd quartile 0.050 (0.070) 0.017 (0.049) 0.029 (0.068)
 3rd quartile 0.045 (0.074) 0.107* (0.051) 0.023 (0.073)
 Highest quartile 0.111 (0.072) 0.108* (0.051) 0.059 (0.073)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 1360 2717 1357
PIAT: Peabody Individual Achievement Test.
All models controlled for child sex and race as well as mother’s years of education and 
changes over time in household income. Standard errors clustered within mothers. Standard 
errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.010; *p < 0.005; **p < 0.010; ***p < 0.001.
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Discussion
The positive effects of parental investments in children, such as reading to 
them or providing high-quality day care, are well documented in recent 
research, as are the socioeconomic gradients in these investments (Cunha 
and Heckman, 2007; Todd and Wolpin, 2007; Yeung et al., 2002). Highly 
educated, financially stable, and/or White parents systematically invest 
more in their children, which offers an explanation for the empirically 
observed gaps in academic success between SES and race groups (e.g. Fryer 
and Levitt, 2004). This article proposes a formal model to explain the mech-
anisms through which these gaps in parental investments come to be and 
how they persist across generations. The main contribution of the article is 
to propose a formal model that clarifies the role of parental beliefs in the 
returns on their investments, a concept traditionally missing from models of 
intergenerational transmission of resources and human capital accumulation 
(e.g. Becker and Tomes, 1986; Cunha et al., 2006)). Rather than assuming 
that all parents know the actual returns on their investments, this article 
presents a model in which parents have a belief about the returns on their 
investments, and this belief may or may not be consistent with the truth. 
Conceptually, the model argues that if parents do not believe that their 
investments are an important factor contributing to their child’s outcomes, 
they will spend more of their resources on personal consumption compared 
to those parents who believe their investments contribute significantly to 
the success of their child.
Consistent with previous research, this article models the process of 
belief formation and evolution by using Bayesian learning (Breen, 1999; 
Morgan, 2005; Piketty, 1995). The model indicates that parents can have 
two different stable beliefs about the returns on their investments. They can 
either hold the true belief knowing the actual returns on their investments or 
hold a false belief, known as the CLE (Breen, 1999; Breen and García-
Peñalosa, 2002; Piketty, 1995), which causes them to underinvest. While 
the true belief is the same for all parents, the CLE varies due to other fac-
tors, such as race and SES. Thus, comparing, for example, high SES and 
low SES parents both at the CLE, the disadvantaged parents will underin-
vest even more so than their advantaged counterparts. This provides two 
explanations for the parental investment gaps that arise from the systematic 
differences in holding true or false beliefs as well as from disadvantaged 
parents who suffer even more severe consequences due to false beliefs than 
do advantaged parents. The model also formalizes the mechanism through 
which parents transmit beliefs to their child and concludes that children are 
more likely to inherit their parents’ stable beliefs, thus reproducing intergen-
erational gaps in parental investments.
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The empirical section of the article uses American data on parental 
investments to test key features of the model. The results offer tentative sup-
port for the existence of two stable beliefs, one true and one false, by show-
ing that parents adjust their investments differently depending on their prior 
investments. Parents with either a high or a low level of prior investments 
do not change their investments in light of their children’s academic success 
or failure, a finding that the model interprets as them having already com-
mitted to the true belief or the CLE, respectively. On the contrary, parents 
with an intermediate level of prior investments react to child academic out-
comes by changing their subsequent level of investments.
Suggestions for future research
Models such as the one presented in this article need not be restricted to 
explaining educational outcomes. Previous empirical research has shown 
differentials in parental investment behavior whether the outcome is child 
health or child education (Ayalew, 2005). Just as the model presented in this 
article draws on Breen’s (1999) work on student beliefs in effort versus abil-
ity, future models could utilize this framework with different outcomes or 
different inputs. This type of formal modeling presents a flexible way to 
conceptualize and explain a wide range of processes regarding the adjust-
ment of beliefs in light of new information and the transmission of these 
beliefs across generations.
In addition, this article holds several prospects for future empirical 
research pertaining to the role of beliefs in parental investments. In particu-
lar, an analysis of longitudinal data sets with direct measures of beliefs 
would be useful with respect to the further investigation of the usefulness of 
the model. Similarly, studies of the links between, on one hand, beliefs in 
the returns on parental investments and, on the other, parents’ actual invest-
ment levels would be valuable.
Limitations and assumptions
The model presented in this article assumes that parent learning is com-
pletely endogenous, that is, that parents only update their beliefs according 
to the signals they receive from their child. This assumption is strong, and 
research on identity formation finds that although parents are the primary 
source of values and beliefs, peer groups and neighborhoods also play an 
important role (Bisin et al., 2011; Fordham and Ogbu, 1986). Furthermore, 
research on the importance of information and beliefs about college costs 
reveals that external sources of learning, such as instruction, can change not 
only the beliefs but also the behaviors of students (Barone et al., 2017; 
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Bettinger et al., 2010; Loyalka et al., 2013). However, as observed by Breen 
(1999), there are several challenges associated with learning from others as, 
for example, it is difficult for parents to obtain precise information on many 
aspects of other parents, such as SES, child’s ability, and level of invest-
ments. Considering this, it seems unlikely that parents will change beliefs 
based on information that they may deem unreliable. However, if parents are 
able to observe a case about which they have information regarding most of 
the variables, such as family or close friends, they may then be able to learn 
from this information. For policy purposes, an example of such a case would 
be to provide parents with prolonged exposure to strong role models, a strat-
egy that has previously proven effective (Evans, 1992; Ssewalama et al., 
2012; Whiting, 2006). In regard to this approach, future research should seek 
to formalize learning from others as a component in the model.
Another limitation of the formal model in its current form is the assump-
tion of one-child families. While this simplification substantially eases the 
derivation and interpretation of the model, it is unlikely to hold for obvious 
reasons. Parents more often than not have more than one child, and it is 
highly plausible that they use lessons learned from their first child to inform 
their investments in the second child. The possibilities to theorize about 
these learning processes are many. For example, do parents hold separate 
beliefs about returns on investment for each child, or do they update a single 
belief for all children? If so, what implications does this have for the first-
born child as parents receive new information? Questions such as these 
should be considered as contributions in themselves and as promising ave-
nues for future research.
Policy implications
Although the formal presented in this article is theoretical and the empirical 
illustration not a strict causal analysis, this article may cautiously inspire a 
new supplementary focus for policy intervention. For example, research on 
college education indicates that it is possible to change people’s beliefs 
about costs and opportunities by providing them with high quality informa-
tion (Barone et al., 2017; Bettinger et al., 2010; Loyalka et al., 2013). On the 
contrary, though, interventions targeted at increasing parental involvement 
show mixed results when it comes to changing parents’ behavior (Pomeranz 
et al., 2007). If, however, persistent parental investment gaps are indeed 
partially rooted in false beliefs about low returns, policy-makers could pro-
vide disadvantaged groups with reliable information and attempt to change 
their beliefs rather than directly affect their behavior. Through campaigning 
and the use of role models, it may be possible to shift low investing parents’ 
beliefs toward the optimal stable belief, thus prompting them to invest more 
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in their child. Such policy interventions are relatively inexpensive com-
pared to targeted monetary transfers. Thus, they may serve to activate 
untapped parent resources already present in disadvantaged racial or social 
groups, thereby narrowing or closing parental investment gaps. It bears 
repeating, however, that this article in itself does not provide sufficient evi-
dence to base any policy intervention on; rather the article presents a theo-
retical framework for further empirical analyses that may bolster or test 
these recommendations.
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Notes
 1. Prior to enrollment in compulsory education, parents may still attempt to make 
inferences about the returns on their investments by, for example, observing 
their child’s cognitive development. The model presented herein only accounts 
for signals of academic performance, but the framework can be extended to 
include preschool investments as well.
 2. Note that this assumption, that parental investments always have positive 
returns, runs somewhat counter to the argument put forth by Pomeranz et al. 
(2007) in which they suggest that certain types of parental involvement may 
adversely affect children. This type of involvement includes, for example, 
increased parental control and negative affect toward the child, which may be 
unproductive. Further work extending the model could formalize this mecha-
nism, but that remains out of scope for this article.
 3. The origins of parental beliefs will be further discussed at a later stage.
 4. These parents do not consider other factors completely irrelevant since ′pi >0 . 
However, they place greater importance on parental investments since ′ ′>θ pi .
 5. Also, z = 1t  leads to pi pit = ′, with ′pi < pi  as stated above.
 6. Although it not formalized within this article, it is easy to imagine that some 
parents may believe that their investments have larger returns than they truly 
138 Rationality and Society 30(1)
do (theoretically, θ > θτ ′ ). While these investments are not unproductive, they 
are sub-optimal with respect to parents’ utility since they could spend these 
resources on consumption instead. This article then assumes that parents do not 
overinvest and notes that overinvestment is not an equilibrium state.
 7. As per a previous footnote, these parents do not consider parental investments 
completely irrelevant as θ > 0 , but they do place greater importance on other 
factors.
 8. This utility function is only defined within the condition of 
 P A U P A Ut A t A( ) ( ( ) )− − >¬1 0 , that is, under  P A U P A Ut A t A( ) ( ( ) )> − ¬1 .
 9. Furthermore, the model assumes time-invariant altruism as well as resources, 
the latter reflecting parents rationally expecting a stable level of resources 
regardless of transitory shocks, such as unexpected unemployment.
10. This assumption, which implies that all parents place the same amount of 
importance on academic achievement, is arguably heroic and contrasts with 
previous theories in which high socioeconomic status (SES) parents derive 
more utility from their children’s education than low SES parents do (e.g. 
Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997). A more realistic model could reflect that some 
parents might have preferences for optimizing their children’s employability or 
steering them toward a specific career. This elaboration is out of scope for the 
current paper, though.
11. Truth, in this sense, is not to be interpreted in any ontological sense, but merely 
as a convenient turn of phrase.
12. All other factors are assumed to be constant.
13. This section formalizes this point below.
14. Naturally, if parents at the confounded learning equilibrium (CLE) accidentally 
invest below their expected level, they could also escape the CLE but would 
eventually converge back to it (cf. Figure 2) making this case uninteresting.
15. The phrasing of the question is, “Some parents spend time teaching their chil-
dren new skills while other parents believe children learn best on their own. 
Which of the following most closely describes your attitude?” and options 
range from “Parents should always spend time teaching their children” to 
“Parents should always allow their children to learn on their own” with two 
intermediate options.
16. All parental investment items are measured identically across child age with 
the exception of number of books owned. The possible answers for this ques-
tion are adjusted for older age groups to reflect accumulation of books through-
out childhood.
17. The model’s estimates do not differ significantly when employing quintiles and 
combining the three intermediate groups or when splitting the sample into three 
groups of equal size.
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Appendix 1
Deriving equation (2)
Proof that parents choose their level of investments according to
I
U aX a X Ra U Ra aX X
U U
t
A t t t A t t
t A A
=
+ − − −( ) + + −( )( )
+ −
¬
¬
1     

pi pi θ θ pi
θ 2U aA¬( )
Recall the utility function of the parents
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Parents maximize their utility by
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Solving the right summand
∂
∂
−( ) −( )( ) = − −
−I
a R I
a
R It
t
t
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1
ln
To solve the left summand, first define
F U U X I U X I U X IA A t t t A t t t A t t t, , , , , ln¬ ¬( ) = +( ) − − +( )(     pi θ pi θ pi θ1 )( )
So the left summand is written as a F U U X IA A t t t⋅ ¬( , , , , , ) pi θ .
This means that
∂
∂
⋅ ( )( ) = ∂∂





 ⋅¬ ¬I
a F U U X I
I
a F U U X I
t
A A t t t
t
A A t, , , , , , , , ,

pi θ pi t t
t
A A t t t
t
A Aa I
F U U X I a
I
F U U
,
, , , , , , ,



θ
pi θ
( ) +
⋅
∂
∂
( )




= ⋅
∂
∂¬ ¬
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




since a  is constant w.r.t. It .
We now have that
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Q.E.D.
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Appendix 2
Partial derivatives from equation (2)
Parents choose their level of investment, It , according to
I
U aX a X Ra U Ra aX X
U U
t
A t t t A t t
t A A
=
+ − − −( ) + + −( )( )
+ −
¬
¬
1     

pi pi θ θ pi
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To show how It  increases or decreases in the equation’s parameters, take 
partial derivatives according to the quotient rule so that for a given param-
eter, V ,
∂
∂
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( ) ( ) − ( ) ′( )
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′I
V
f x g x f x g x
g x
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2
where
f x U aX a X Ra U Ra aX XA t t t A t t( ) = + − − −( ) + + −( )( )¬ 1     pi pi θ θ pi
and
g x U U U at A A A( ) = + −( )¬ ¬θ 2
As per usual, It  increases in a given parameter, V , if ( )/∂ ∂ >I Vt 0  and 
decreases if ( )/∂ ∂ <I Vt 0 . The following derivations show if, and under 
which assumptions, It  increases or decreases in each of the equation’s 
parameters. In interest of space, the derivations are not fully annotated or 
expanded. Full proofs with annotation are available upon request.
Parents’ resources, R . Proof that ( )/∂ ∂ >I Rt 0 .
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2
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By assumption, U UA A> ¬ , and 0 1< <a , so U U U aA A A+ >¬ ¬2 , and 
a U UA A−( ) >¬ 0 , so ( )/∂ ∂ >I Rt 0 . Thus, It  always increases in parents’ 
resources, R .
Q.E.D.
Parents’ altruism, a . Proof of the conditions under which ( )/∂ ∂ >I at 0 .
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So if
X
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∂
>
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¬
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Algebraically, this expression reduces to
U a R U R
U U
R a
A t t A t t
A A
t
¬
¬
− − −( ) + −( )
> +( )
2 22 2
2 1 2



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pi θ pi θ
θ
X X
It  increases in parents’ altruism if 
( ( ) / ( ))( ) ( )U a R U R U U R aA t t A t t A A t¬ ¬− − − + − > +
2 22 2 2 1 2    pi θ pi θ θX X . 
Otherwise, ( )/∂ ∂ <I at 0 .
Q.E.D.
Utility of academic success, UA . Proof of the conditions under which 
( / )∂ ∂ >I Ut A 0 .
∂
∂
=
( ) ( ) − ( ) ( )
( ) 
′ ′I
U
f x g x f x g x
g x
t
A
2
′( ) = + −( )f x Ra aX Xt t θ pi
′( ) =g x tθ
g x U U U at A A A( )  = + −( ) ¬ ¬
2 2
2θ
∂
∂
=
+ −( )  + −( ) 
− +
¬ ¬
¬I
U
Ra aX X U U U a
U aX
t
A
t t t A A A
A t




θ pi θ
pi
2
1 − − −( ) + + −( )( ) 
+ −¬ ¬
a X Ra U Ra aX X
U U U a
t t A t t t
t A A A

 



pi θ θ pi θ
θ 2( ) 
=
+ −( )( ) + −( )
− + − −
¬ ¬
¬
2
2
1
Ra aX X U U U a
U aX a X
t t A A A
A t t


 
θ pi
pi pi −( ) + + −( )( )( )
+ −( )

¬ ¬
Ra U Ra aX X
U U U a
t A t t
t A A A
 


θ θ pi
θ 2 2
Hjorth-Trolle 147
SinceU U U aA A A+ − >¬ ¬2 0  and θt > 0 , θt A A AU U U a[( ) ]+ − >¬ ¬2 0
2 , 
then ( / )∂ ∂ >I Ut A 0  when
Ra aX X U U U a U
aX a X Ra
t t A A A A
t t t


 

θ pi
pi pi θ
+ −( )( ) + −( ) >
+ − − −( ) +
¬ ¬ ¬2
1 U Ra aX XA t t

θ pi+ −( )( )
Algebraically, this expression reduces to a R Xt t( ) ( / )

θ pi+ > 1 2 .
It  increases in the utility of academic success if a R Xt t( ) ( / )

θ pi+ > 1 2 . 
Otherwise, ( ) / ( )∂ ∂ <I Ut A 0 .
Q.E.D.
Disutility of academic failure, U¬A. Proof of the conditions under which 
( / )∂ ∂ >¬I Ut A 0 .
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∂
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U
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A
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A
1 2
1
 
 pi pi θ θ
+ − − −( ) + + −( )( ) 
− 
 
 

 
pi pi θ θ pi
θ θ
t t t A t t
t t
aX a X Ra U Ra aX X
a2 
+ −( ) ¬ ¬θt A A AU U U a2
2
Since [ ]( )θt A A AU U U a+ − >¬ ¬2 0
2 , then ( / )∂ ∂ >¬I Ut A 0  when
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1 2
1
+ − − −  + −( ) 
> + −
¬ ¬
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 
 

pi pi θ θ
pi
t t t t A A A
A t
aX a X Ra U U U a
U aX a − −( ) + + −( )( ) 
− 

 

 
pi θ θ pi
θ θ
t t A t t
t t
X Ra U Ra aX X
a2
Algebraically, this expression reduces to a R Xt t( ) ( / )

θ pi+ < 1 2  (see note 
below).
It  increases in the disutility of academic failure if a R Xt t( ) ( / )

θ pi+ < 1 2 . 
Otherwise, ( / )∂ ∂ <¬I Ut A 0 .
Q.E.D.
Note that the above derivation implicitly assumes that 
f x U aX a X Ra U Ra aX XA t t t A t t( ) [ ] .( ) ( ( ))= + − − − + + − >¬ 1 0    pi pi θ θ pi  
However, this assumption does not need to hold to reach the final result 
since I multiply by f x( )  twice and thus flip the inequality sign either twice 
(if f x( ) < 0 ) or never (if f x( ) > 0 ). The only formally required assump-
tion for the derivation regarding f x( )  is f x( ) 0.
Parents’ belief in the returns to investments, θt . Proof of the conditions under 
which ( / )∂ ∂ >It tθ 0 .
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∂
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( ) ( ) − ( ) ( )
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≠
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Since [ ]( )θt A A AU U U a+ − >¬ ¬2 0
2 , ( / )∂ ∂ >It tθ 0  when
Ra U U U U U a
U aX a X Ra U Ra
t A A A A A
A t t t A

 

θ
pi pi θ
−( ) + −( )
− + − − −( ) +
¬ ¬ ¬
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2
1  θ pit t
A A A
aX X
U U U a
+ −( )( ) 
+ −[ ] >¬ ¬2 0
Algebraically, this expression reduces to 
 pi pit A A A t A A AX U U U a X U U U( ) ( ( ) )¬ ¬ ¬ ¬+ − > + − .
This expression is always true when pi t A A AX U U U¬ ¬+( ) >  since 1> a  
and always false otherwise. So, It  increases in parents’ belief in the returns 
to investments if pi t A A AX U U U( )¬ ¬+ > , an expression which equals both 
pi t A A AX U U U> +¬ ¬(( ) / ( ))  and ( (( ) / ( ))/ )U U X XA A t t¬ < − pi pi1 . 
Otherwise, ( / )∂ ∂ <It tθ 0 .
Q.E.D.
Parents’ other factors, X . Proof that ( )/∂ ∂ <I Xt 0 .
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Since 0 1< <a , this means that a − <1 0 . In addition, 0 1< <pi t  and 
U UA A¬ + > 0 , so pi t A Aa U U( )( )− + <¬1 0 .
Thus, by θt A A AU U U a( )+ − >¬ ¬2 0 , ( )/∂ ∂ <I Xt 0 . It  always decreases 
in parents’ other factors, X .
Q.E.D.
Parents’ belief in the returns to other factors, π˜t . Proof that ( / )∂ ∂ <It tpi 0.
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2
2
2
θ
By assumption, U UA A> ¬ , so U U UA A A+ >¬ ¬2 , so 
θt A A AU U U a( )+ − >¬ ¬2 0 . In addition, 0 1< <a , so U a UA A<  and 
U a UA A¬ ¬< , and 0 1< <X , so [ ( )]X U a U U a UA A A A¬ ¬− + − < 0 . Thus, 
( / )∂ ∂ <It tpi 0  and It  always decreases in parents’ belief in the returns to 
other factors, πt.
Q.E.D.
Appendix 3
Proof that the confounded learning equilibrium (CLE) increases 
in other factors, X 
We have
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As per Appendix 2, we use the quotient rule to prove the conditions 
under which ( /*∂ ∂ >z X ) 0
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So if
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Algebraically, this expression reduces to
R U U
a
a
U R U a X U UA A A A A Api θ pi θ+( ) +( ) + −− −( ) − −( )( ) >¬ ¬ ¬
1 2
1
1 1
Knowing that R U UA A( )( )pi θ pi+ + >¬ 0  and θU A¬ > 0 , we assume 
R U U U U U R RA A A A A( ) ( (( ) / ( ( )))( ) / )pi θ pi pi pi θ+ + > ⇔ ≥ − +¬ ¬ ¬ 1 . Then 
( )/∂ ∂ >z X* 0  when (( ) / ( ))( ( ) ( ))1 2 1 1 1 0− − − − − >a a R U a X UA A , that is, 
when both ( ) / ( )1 2 1− −a a  and ( ( ) ( ))R U a X UA A1 1− − −  are either posi-
tive or negative at the same time.
Now, by
1 2
1
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−
−
> ⇔ <
a
a
a .
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1 2
1
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−
−
< ⇔ >
a
a
a .
as well as
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U
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−
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we conclude that, under the assumption that 
( (( ) / ( ))/ )U U R RA A¬ ≥ − +1 pi pi θ , ( )/∂ ∂ >z X* 0  if
(1) a < 0.5 and R X U U aA A> − −(( ) / ( ))1 1
or if
(2) a > 0.5 and R X U U aA A< − −(( ) / ( ))1 1 .
In other words, ∂ ∂z X* /  is only negative if a high level of altruism, a , 
is combined with a high level of resources, R , compared to other factors, 
X , or in the case of low altruism, a , combined with a low level of resources, 
R,  compared with other factors, X . While not always the case, given that 
( )) / (1 1− −U U aA A  increases in a , a high level of altruism will be likely to 
satisfy both the condition R X U U aA A< − −(( ) / ( ))1 1  as well as a > 0 5.  
and vice versa.
Regarding the assumption that 
R U U U U U R RA A A A A( ) ( (( ) / ( ))( ) / )pi θ pi pi pi θ+ + > ⇔ ≥ − +¬ ¬ ¬ 1 , this is 
only violated under a low level of parents’ resources combined with a small 
difference between UA  and U¬A. However, as UA / U¬A goes toward one, 
∂ ∂z X* /  may become negative for low resource parents.
Q.E.D.
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Appendix 4. Parental investment—individual items and their distributions.
Phrasing of question Distribution of answers
About how many books does child 
have?
6–9 years old  
 None 1.09%
 1 or 2 3.58%
 3–9 11.47%
 ≥10 83.84%
10–14 years old  
 None 2.09%
 1 or 9 18.28%
 10–19 17.48%
 ≥20 62.15%
Is there a musical instrument (e.g. 
piano, drum, guitar) that your child can 
use here at home?
Yes 50.99%
No 49.01%
Does your child get special lessons 
or belong to any organization that 
encourages activities such as sports, 
music, art, dance, and drama?
Yes 40.82%
No 59.18%
How often has any family member 
taken or arranged to take your child 
to any type of museum (children’s, 
scientific, art, historical, etc.) within the 
past year?
Never 25.77%
Once or twice 38.90%
Several times 26.77%
About once a month 7.18%
About once a week or 
more often
1.37%
How often has a family member 
taken or arranged to take your child 
to any type of musical or theatrical 
performance within the past year?
Never 39.63%
Once or twice 37.66%
Several times 17.91%
About once a month 
or more
3.87%
About once a week or 
more
0.93%
When your family watches TV together, 
do you or your child’s father or father-
figure discuss TV programs with him 
or her?
No 18.82%
Yes 80.80%
Do not have a TV 0.38%
